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By PETER JAN HONIGSBERG**
As I TURNED the corner onto Seventh Street from Mission Street in
San Francisco on that Monday morning, October 1, 2000, I knew I was
watching history unfold. The satellite dishes, the neon-bright lights set
atop the media vans, and members of the press fidgeting anxiously
had replaced the homeless who usually encamp near the main en-
trance to the Federal Court of Appeals building. As many as two hun-
dred members of the national and international media had arrived
that day, some as early as 4:15 A.M., although the music industry's law-
suit against Napster was scheduled to begin at 11:00 A.M.I A television
reporter was interviewing a balding man in a blue striped suit, the
artificial lamps barely making a dent in the gray, dull natural light.
I. Piracy-the Word of the Day
While I watched the reporters lining up at the door to the court-
house, I could not help but see the "P" word flashing overhead. The
five major record companies ("the majors") and the Recording Indus-
try Association of America ("RIAA")-the association that represents
the companies-had paid their publicity agents and lawyers well.
Piracy was the word of the day. Actually, at least where Napster was
concerned, it was the word of the entire millennium year of 2000, and
continued to be the word after the Ninth Circuit issued its unanimous
* Just like the technology upon which this essay is based, the essay itself will be out
of date the moment the typing stops.
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1. The proceedings were also shown live on television and in streaming video over
the Internet. It was the first time that the Ninth Circuit allowed a live telecast.
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but dispiriting decision against Napster four months later on February
12, 2001.2
Napster was revolutionary. It was one of the most innovative ap-
plications to ever emerge on the Internet ("the Net"). It opened up
musical horizons. Through a simple file sharing program that em-
ployed ingenious Peer to Peer ("P2P") architecture, people searched
each other's computer hard drives and transferred songs. 3 Napster's
P2P architecture had been hailed by techies as the third most impor-
tant advancement on the Internet, after email and the Web browser.
The songs were not routed by or stored on Napster servers.
Rather, Napster used central servers to provide a real time directory
that specified the names and locations of the songs saved on the users'
computers. The names of the songs, that is, the file names, were desig-
nated by the users, not by Napster. Songs on Napster were
downloaded in an MP3 format.4
People contributed to Napster by uploading, or ripping songs
from their compact discs ("CDs") onto their hard drives, compressing
them into the MP3 format (using compression software available on
the Web) and then adding the songs to their files. People also
uploaded songs from tapes and vinyl recordings by plugging the tape
or record player into the computer's audio input.
According to some reports, Napster was the fastest growing In-
ternet site in history. In its first year, Napster reached twenty million
users. In contrast, AOL had, after more than a decade in business,
twenty-three million subscribers. 5 Before Napster shut down, sixty mil-
2. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). On June 22,
2001, the court denied Napster's request for a rehearing before the full court. See A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2001) (panel reh'g & reh'g
en banc denied).
3. Under a P2P system, the user avoids the bottlenecks that occur when there are too
many users seeking information from the same server. Thus, P2P networking is very differ-
ent from the usual search for information on the Internet. The typical search begins with
an Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), like a cable or Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") com-
pany, that seeks out a search engine such as Yahoo or Google to search the Web for infor-
mation or files.
4. MP3 technology was developed by a German engineering firm in 1987 as a way of
compressing digital audio files by removing inaudible space and squeezing the rest. Before
MP3s were created, a person would usually need several hours to download a song from
the Internet. MP3 software compresses the song into a file that takes only one-twelfth of
the usual disk space. Transmission time is in minutes or less, depending on whether the
download is through a phone line, or a faster DSL or cable line. MP3 songs do not deterio-
rate with each use (as a vinyl record will, but a CD will not).
5. See Derek W. Wan, The voice behind 'You've got mail', KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS
SERVICE, July 5, 2000.
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lion users shared over one billion songs (many of which were, of
course, the same) on Napster. At Napster's peak use, during a one
hour period, over three million people exchanged more than three
hundred fifty million songs. Napster was one of the most visited sites
on the Internet in the summer of 2000.6 Napster as we knew it is only
a memory now. But the Napster we knew and loved became a cultural
audio archive of the twentieth century. People downloaded not only
recorded music, but also speeches of Martin Luther King and Mal-
colm X; Charlie "Bird" Parker's jazz recordings performed in clubs
but never on record; Maria Callas's old recordings on 78 r.p.m.
records; rareJanisJoplin andJimi Hendrix concert performances; Sat-
urday Night Live sketches; Amos and Andy radio shows; and Cheech and
Chong skits.7
Although Napster's users may have lost the battle in the Ninth
Circuit, they have not lost the war. The record companies have scored
a Pyrrhic victory. Pandora's box has been unlocked. And while the
major record companies would like nothing more than to maintain
their successful old-fashioned business model of selling vinyl albums
and CDs, new and more sophisticated programs have burst forth to
replace Napster.
The Napster clones are considerably more Internet savvy. Web
sites that have evolved since Napster do not rely on central servers (as
Napster did) that courts can easily pinpoint and shut down. At the
turn of the twenty-first century, technological wizards created the first
alternatives to Napster-Gnutella 8 and Freenet.9 Although they did
not rely on central servers, these sites were less elegant than Napster,
and were clunky in their architecture.' 0 Several additional sites came
6. See Becky Beaupre, Suit can't stop Napster from gaining, CI. SUN-TImES, Aug. 28,
2000, at 26.
7. Most live concerts, radio recordings and television recordings are, of course, not
owned by the record companies.
8. http://www.gnutella.com.
9. http://freenetproject.org.
10. Freenet and Gnutella are both open source code (the source code is a program-
mer's basic instructions; an open source code means that the program is in the public
domain) and they have no central servers. When a request is made, the search is tracked
among the users on the system until the song is found. Gnutella and Freenet do not direct
the path that the search takes and consequently the file's delivery is virtually untraceable.
Actually, the story of the creation of Gnutella is instructive. Justin Frankel who had
earlier created Winamp, an online music player, heard from his brother at college that the
college had shut down access to Napster. (In addition to litigating against Napster, the
record companies had sent letters to colleges around the country informing them that
their students were illegally downloading copyrighted material while on Napster, and im-
plied that the colleges were contributing to the illegal downloads by not taking any action.
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online after Gnutella and Freenet, including Aimster"1 and Audio-
galaxy.12 But the most important online music sites that appeared in
2001 were three technologically advanced and user-intuitive programs
that relied on the same software. All three-KaZaA, 13 MusicCity 14
(which operates Morpheus) and Grokster 15- employ the same Fast-
Track 16 software and the same P2P network. In a repeat of the Napster
scenario, the record industry filed lawsuits in October and November
2001 against these three. But even if the record companies succeed
against the FastTrack software Web sites,' 7 other programs will replace
them-the genie is out of the bottle!
A number of colleges responded by blocking student access to Napster, professing
bandwidth problems.) Justin wrote a source code in response to his brother's concern,
informing his brother that the college would not be able to shut the new code down, and
so Gnutella was born. Because America Online ("AOL") owned Frankel's software com-
pany, Nullsoft, at the time he created Gnutella, and because AOL was set to merge with
Time Warner (one of the five major record companies), it shut the program down. But it
was too late: the same day Gnutella was posted on the Web, programmers downloaded
hundreds of copies of it and made it available to other sites.
11. http://www.madster.com (formerly http://www.aimster.com).
12. http://www.audiogalaxy.com.
13. http://www.kazaa.com. KaZaA was based in the Netherlands, but is now owned by
an Australian company. See infra note 17.
14. http://www.musiccity.com. MusicCity is based in Nashville, TN.
15. http://www.grokster.com. Grokster is based in the West Indies.
16. FastTrack is a P2P technology developed by a Dutch-based company that allows
individuals to share files and communicate with other individuals on several different net-
works at the same time. FastTrack licenses the technology to companies like Grokster,
KaZaA and MusicCity (Morpheus), allowing users of the three file sharing programs to
access each other's files. Unlike Napster technology, which processed individual requests
through a centralized server, the FastTrack search requests and actual downloads do not
pass through a centralized server. Rather, the individual FastTrack users search "Super
Nodes," which are other FastTrack users who meet certain bandwidth, latency, and
processing power criteria. The Super Nodes point the search requests to the location
where the file can be downloaded directly from another FastTrack user.
FastTrack also improved on the Napster technology by developing "Intelligent
Downloads" which automatically locate the fastest source to download a file on the net-
work. The files can be downloaded simultaneously from several sources, if the network
calculates that this will improve the download speed. Network bandwidth is reduced by
breaking the downloadable files into several chunks, with each chunk being downloaded
from a separate source.
17. On January 16, 2002, KaZaA voluntarily suspended its downloads to wait for the
decision of a Dutch court on January 31, 2002. See John Borland, Popular file-trader halts
software downloads, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 17, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2110-1023-
817147.html?legacy=cnet&tag--st.net.1005.sndstry.ni. However, a few days later, on January
20, an Australian company, Sharman Networks, Ltd., purchased KaZaA and resumed the
downloads. See Benny Evangelista, Australian company buys Kazaa, puts Napster-like service back
on Internet, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at BI.
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Today, more people cumulatively log onto the FastTrack sites
than the sixty million people who logged onto Napster at its peak.18
All three sites are not only faster than Napster, and just as user
friendly, they also provide fast download access to other media.
Within a week after The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring and
Harry Potter appeared in theaters, college students were downloading
the movies onto their hard drives.1 9
II. Control and the Music Business Distribution Model
It is amazing how the media can twist a story with just one word.
Since the fall of 1999, when Napster launched its pioneering P2P mu-
sic sharing system, nearly every person had been talking piracy when it
came to Napster. Lawyers, musicians, Napster users, and people who
had heard of Napster but had never visited the site had all rushed to
judgment. To them, Napster was a pirate that violated copyright law.
But the record companies wanted to protect more than their copy-
rights.2 0 Piracy was a smokescreen. If the major record companies had
wanted to settle, Napster offered many opportunities. Behind the
smokescreen lurked another fear that paralyzed the music industry far
more than its fear of piracy. What the record companies really
dreaded was losing control of the distribution of their music.
The five companies and their major labels21 compose eighty-five
percent of the recording industry. The other fifteen percent is made
up of independent labels, most of which use the majors to distribute
their music. These same five companies settled with the United States
government in May 2000 after the Federal Trade Commission found
that the companies had overcharged consumers by five hundred mil-
18. See John Borland, Suit hits popular post-Napster network, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 3,
2001, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-273855.html?legacy=cnet ("Analysis company
Webnoize estimated that 3.05 billion files were downloaded using the FastTrack-based net-
work, Audiogalaxy, iMesh and the Gnutella network during August. That compared with a
similar estimate of 2.79 billion files downloaded through Napster in February 2001, the
peak of that service's popularity.").
19. Federal law enforcement agents seized computers containing copies of the latest
movies and other copyrighted software at various colleges around the country in December
2001. See Philip Shenon, Internet Piracy Is Suspected as U.S. Agents Raid Campuses, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2001, at Cl.
20. Record companies claim copyright in their sound recordings, and in "works made
for hire" (where artists sign away their rights under their recording contracts). See Recording
Artists Fighting for Rights, DAILYJ., Jan. 8, 2002, at 3.
21. Sony (Columbia, Epic); EMI (Capital, EMI, Virgin, Chrysalis); BMG/Bertelsmann
(RCA, Arista); Warner Music Group, a division of AOL Time Warner (Warner Bros., Elec-
tra, Atlantic); and Vivendi Universal (Universal, MCA, Mercury/Island, A&M, Geffen, In-
terscope, Motown).
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lion dollars over the past four years. 22 There had been talk in spring
2001 that EMI might merge with BMG, leaving only four majors. How-
ever, antitrust authorities in the European Union threw a wedge into
the proposed merger by concluding that the merger would unreason-
ably reduce competition.
Furthermore, most of the public bought into the majors' asser-
tions that because of Napster, the record companies, the recording
artists, and the songwriters had lost royalties, an allegation they
dropped in October 2001.23 Federal DistrictJudge Patel's unreflective
lightning-swift decision granting the music companies' request for a
preliminary injunction halting Napster's file sharing program in July
200024 did little more than parrot the briefs filed by the music indus-
try. The Ninth Circuit decision 25 similarly reflected the prevailing atti-
tude that Napster was little more than a modern bandit. The only
question some commentators had after the Court of Appeals decision
was why it took the Ninth Circuit four months to do little more than
agree with Judge Patel.
In industry lingo, music companies are called "distributors" and
recording contracts are often called "distribution agreements." Eric
Godtland, the manager of the rock group Third Eye Blind, astutely
explained the system to me: the record industry's principal consumers
are not the people who buy the CDs. The key customers are Wal-Mart,
Kmart, Tower, Sam Goody, and other brick and mortar sellers of
records. Record stores take anywhere from ten to fifty percent of the
retail price. The brick and mortar stores are therefore the businesses
that have the most to lose if the distribution model changes. In the
short haul, the record industry still needs Wal-Mart to sustain its busi-
ness model.
Godtland saw the record companies as having deeply entrenched
interests. Even if they are beginning to see that change is inevitable,
they have such a good thing going that they are hesitant to transform
their business model. In October 2000, Godtland told me:
Record executives do not want a fast track to the consumer. They
very carefully arranged the system for selling songs. They don't
want a digital design. They want to keep things just the way they
22. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Record Companies Settle FTC
Charges of Restraining Competition in CD Music Market (May 10, 2000), available at http:/
/www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm.
23. See discussion infra.
24. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
25. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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are. Their faith is to ride the horse into the ground... until it has
heart failure,
he laughed. Continuing, he said,
people in the business only care about this year. They want it to be
the same as last year and the previous ten years. They wake up
every morning hoping Napster [or any instrument of change for
that matter] has gone away.
But, he concluded,
the good news for them is that it isn't over. They still got the
numbers. 26
In fact, record sales had actually increased before Napster shut down.
In 2000, when Napster was at its peak, record sales increased by 500
million dollars.2 7 FromJanuary to March 4, 2001, sales of CDs were up
5.7% from the same period in 2000,28 but after Napster was shut
down, record sales dropped.29 The music industry attributed the de-
cline to the slowing economy. Nevertheless, one can argue that after
Napster's file sharing program was shut down, the music industry lost
one of its primary sources of advertising (a system that is not all that
different from Columbia Record House-where the consumer
purchases a number of CDs for a penny and is then exposed to new
songs and new artists).
The industry further argued that the increase in sales while Nap-
ster was in operation was due to the strong economy, and that sales
would have increased even further if Napster had not existed. They
pointed to decreasing sales in some record stores near college cam-
puses-since college students originally constituted a large segment of
Napster users. However, that demographic changed as Napster's pop-
ularity grew and increasing numbers of thirty, forty, and fifty someth-
ings logged onto to the site.
Napster argued that after being exposed to the music and artists
on its Web site, people went out and bought CDs. Several research
groups affirmed that Napster acted as an impetus for sales and Nap-
ster users were significantly more likely to purchase music than non-
26. Telephone interview with Eric Godtland, EGM, Inc. (Oct. 20, 2000).
27. See Roy Bragg, Court allows Napster to run-for now; File sharer still in dire straits, SAN
ANTONIo ExPREsS, Feb. 13, 2001, at IA.
28. SeeJeff Leeds, Album Sales Test the Napster Effect, L.A. TiMEs, June 20, 2001, at Cl.
29. See id. In 2000, 785 million albums were sold in the United States; in 2001, 763
million albums were sold. See Major Slump for US Album Sales, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2002 (quot-
ing statistics gathered by Soundscan), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/entertain-
ment/music/newsid_1741000/1741941.stm.
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users. 30 For many Napster users, it was a lot faster and easier to buy a
CD than to copy the songs using a CD burner;3 1 besides, CD burners
cost around $300. Interestingly, when the record companies re-
quested summaryjudgment on October 10, 2001, they did not rely on
any claim of harm to the CD sales market.
At the end of the twentieth century, the music industry's business
model of manufacturing the records, packaging the albums, placing
them on pallets, and delivering them to the stores was on its way out.
It was the alarm of seeing its business model slip away without any
immediate successor that caused the industry to sue Napster. The in-
dustry argued piracy to the public, but it was really concerned about
control over the promotion and distribution of its music. Although
the industry successfully quashed Napster, its control over Internet ac-
cess to digital music is still as tenuous as it was that October 1, thanks
to future generations of Napster imitators.
When Frank Biondi, former chair of Universal Studios (and for-
mer CEO of HBO and Viacom), was asked to comment on the en-
tertainment industry, he said, "Hollywood still believes there's never a
penalty for being a slow adopter. '3 2 Substitute "the record industry"
for "Hollywood," and the quote would be equally true. Larry Lessig, a
Stanford University law professor and a premier expert on cyberspace
law recently noted that "it's the intent of the music industry to stifle
and slow innovation to better protect existing market positions. When-
ever there is a model created they don't like, they sue and get it pretty
much stopped. '33
The record companies argued in their briefs to the Ninth Circuit
that they were working on an Internet distribution model at the time
Napster appeared. To the extent that it was true, it was little more
than a faint-hearted attempt. The industry was not really interested in
redesigning a distribution business model that had been successful for
nearly one hundred years. In fact, at the time the record companies
argued to the Ninth Circuit that they wanted-and intended-to offer
30. See, e.g., Defendant Napster's Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum of Point & Authorities, In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation at 9 n.8
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. C-MOL-00-1369 MHP) (stating, "[the] L.A. TIMES reports that CD
sales continued to rise until Napster was constrained by injunction-at which point CD
sales declined.").
31. Electronic equipment that makes copies.
32. Michael Menduno, MP3 Meets MPAA, WIRED, Nov. 2000 at 3, available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.11/mustread.html?pg=3.
33. Mary Anne Ostrom, Law and the Internet: more worries than hopes, Q&A: Lawrence
Lessig, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 25, 2001, at IF.
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online music on their own, they had made no credible attempt at of-
fering music on the Net. When they finally began offering music on
the Net in early 2000, they offered a very limited selection and priced
individual songs at "between $2.49 and $3.29 per download. '34 As one
commentator wrote, "consumers didn't care to pay $3 for a song
wrapped in clunky security software . . .- 5
Realizing that the demand for digital music on the Net would not
go away and fearing the effects of other more updated online Napster
clones, the record companies acted brazenly and injudiciously. Within
months of the Ninth Circuit decision in February, and only hours
before a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing was to begin on access
to digital music, the record companies revealed that they had entered
into joint ventures creating online subscription music services. Not
surprisingly, the two distribution companies, MusicNet and pressplay
(formerly called Duet) were owned by the record companies.
MusicNet was owned by BMG, EMI, Warner Music Group,
RealNetworks (which developed the technology) and Zomba Records,
a large independent label. Pressplay was owned by Sony and Universal.
Other businesses wanting to sell digital musical recordings produced
by the five major record companies on the Net were required to enter
into restrictive arrangements with these two distributors, or were effec-
tively locked out of their music. The industry's arrogant behavior may
have backfired.
On October 10, 200 1,Judge Patel heard the industry's request for
summary judgment on 213 copyright infringed works. A decision in
favor of the music companies would have opened the door to the
computation of damages Napster would be obligated to pay for copy-
right infringement. Instead, when Napster argued to Judge Patel that
the arrangement the music industry forged with MusicNet and pressp-
lay created horizontal price-fixing combinations 36 by setting whole-
34. Laura Rhode, Universal to Offer Digital Music Downloads, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD,
Aug. 1, 2000, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,17284,00.html.
35. Michael Learmonth & Ronna Abramson, In Digital Music, First You Must Eat Your
Rivals, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 6, 2001, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/
0,1902,28275,00.html.
36. It is illegal for competitors to conspire together to fix prices. This kind of attempt
at market control is prevented by section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). The
Sherman Act prevents conspiracies in restraint of trade, and price fixing is considered a
per se violation of the antitrust laws. Horizontal price restraints are fixed prices, or some
other kind of strict price-setting guidelines, imposed by would-be competitors on the mar-
ketplace. The effects of horizontal price restraints include a price to consumers which is
higher than the marketplace would otherwise demand if competition were allowed to work
effectively.
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sale, and possibly also retail, prices for their digitally distributed
recordings, Patel became concerned. Patel's reaction was surprising,
because Napster had raised the same misuse of copyright issue to her
and to the Ninth Circuit panel in 2000, and both courts dismissed the
issue with little comment or consideration.
In fact, up to this point in the history of litigation between Nap-
ster and the record companies, Judge Patel had been blatantly unsym-
pathetic, if not thoroughly disagreeable, to Napster. Yet she was
apparently disturbed enough by the allegation at the October 10 hear-
ing to remark, "I'm really confused as to why the plaintiffs came upon
this way of getting together in a joint venture. Even if it passes anti-
trust analysis, it looks bad, sounds bad and smells bad."37 At the end of
the hearing, she concluded that a decision for summary judgment
would be premature.
Napster further argued that along with other small independent
services, it too was a victim of the joint ventures. Napster had signed a
distribution deal with MusicNet that prohibited Napster from con-
tracting to secure licenses with pressplay and its labels, Sony and Uni-
versal. Under the terms of the deal, Napster could not contract
individually with Warner and EMI without MusicNet's consent. 38 Un-
doubtedly, the record companies would have liked as little as possible
to do with the pirate Napster. They certainly would rather not see
Napster, for all the trouble it has caused them, rewarded and-even
more importantly-a company that could become independent of the
record companies sometime in the future.
Napster also argued that the companies engaged in vertical fore-
closure of the digital music market39 by refusing to enter into agree-
ments on reasonable terms with independent sources for digital
37. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Napster Accuses Labels of Abusing Licenses, Industry Calls
Charges a Sideshow, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 11, 2001, at 1C.
38. BMG had purchased a twenty percent interest in Napster on October 31, 2000,
and thus did not forbid Napster's negotiating separately with it. See discussion infra Part III.
39. Vertical foreclosures of a market are prohibited under the antitrust laws because
they restrain trade. See the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C..§ 1 (2001). If done to monopolize a
particular market, there might also be a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2001). Vertical restraints occur when companies at different levels in the production and
distribution chain (such as a supplier of raw materials, a manufacturer, and a distributor)
collude in an attempt to have an anti-competitive advantage over others in the market-
place. "Foreclosure occurs when vertical integration by one firm denies another firm access
to a market." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 140-41 (3d ed. 1999). Here, by creating
their own distribution channels for digital music, and by refusing to deal with the existing
online companies, the record companies are effectively foreclosing the digital music mar-
ketplace for the existing companies like Napster. In addition, group boycotts and refusals
to deal are also violations of the Sherman Act.
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distribution and by imposing burdensome licensing requirements on
both retail competitors and their customers. There was also concern
that MusicNet and pressplay would offer licenses to each other on
terms more favorable than those offered to other digital distributors,
thus expanding their dominance into digital music distribution. Ac-
cording to Napster's expert, Stanford Professor Roger Noll, the ma-
jors' anticompetitive behaviors would have the effect of squeezing out
a number of independent wholesale and retail competitors. The result
would harm consumers by raising prices, and harm artists by reducing
competition for the right to distribute their recordings.40
In addition, Noll pointed out that because independent labels
are often excluded from prime retail shelf space by the major record
companies, online distribution could offer the independents less
costly access to the consumer-that is, if the major record companies
do not dominate and otherwise restrain the distribution system. 41
At a future hearing, Judge Patel could find that the record com-
panies and their online distributors colluded by merging the distribu-
tion of their digital recordings into two companies in violation of
federal antitrust laws. If she does, whatever damages the majors ex-
pected to acquire from Napster for Napster's violation of their copy-
rights would be offset, if not entirely enveloped, by the damages they
would be compelled to pay to compensate Napster and other ex-
cluded online distributors for antitrust violations.
Following the October 10 hearing, the United States Justice De-
partment's Antitrust Division sent out civil investigative demands
("CIDs") to the record companies, MusicNet, pressplay, and the Re-
cording Industry Association of America seeking further information
on the joint ventures. 42 The CIDs included questions on whether the
companies intended, by leveraging the copyrights, to control content
and the distribution channel.
At the Future of Music Policy Summit held in Washington, D.C.,
in January 2002, Mark Cuban, who founded Broadcast.com and owns
the Dallas Mavericks, stressed the theme that the record companies
are willing to make decisions against their economic self-interest by
not licensing their full catalogs to independent online distributors.
40. See Declaration of Roger Noll, Morris M. Doyle Professor of Public Policy, Stan-
ford University, in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Nap-
ster's Rule 56(f) Motion at 4, In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation (No. C-MDL-00-1369
MHP) (redacted-not filed under seal).
41. See id. at 4-6.
42. SeeJon Healy, Antitrust Probe of Music Fins Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001,
available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-000082195oct15.story.
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"The people who had the keys to the mall decided to burn it down
rather than try to make money from it. The premium wasn't on mak-
ing money, the premium was on control."43
Apparently, Napster's claims that the music industry's practices
are anticompetitive are terrifying the record companies. Four of the
five companies made a paradigm shift from their intransigent stance
of refusing to negotiate with Napster and, in January 2002, requested
that the lawsuit against Napster be suspended. (EMI did not partici-
pate in the request.) Judge Patel granted a thirty-day suspension on
January 22. 4 4
Evidently, Patel was about to issue discovery orders against the
record companies in order to further probe the industry's joint ven-
tures. Patel had also agreed to inquire into Napster's allegation that
the record companies may not own many of the copyrights that they
claim. 45 Cary Sherman, general counsel for the RLAA, explained that
the discovery orders would "get the parties more enmeshed in litiga-
tion and less focused on resolution. ' 46 In other words, the record
companies were alarmed at what the court and the government might
learn, and saw a settlement as an escape route from the investigations.
In essence, if the record companies are permitted to control, con-
solidate, and seriously restrict online distribution (including online
costs and the catalog of available songs), they can continue to aggres-
sively sell their CDs and vinyl records-a market with which they are
familiar and in which they have been wildly successful during the
twentieth century. Once again, the record companies appear to be
doing whatever it takes to continue their monopolization of recorded
music.
4 7
III. The History of Napster
Napster began in the fall of 1998, when Shawn Fanning, Nap-
ster's creator, was an eighteen year old freshman at Northeastern Uni-
versity in Boston. Shawn originated his P2P architecture by combining
the features of existing programs-Internet Relay Chat (a real time
43. Jon Pareles, The Many Futures of Music, Maybe One of Them Real, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2002, at BI (quoting Mark Cuban).
44. See Matt Richtel, Judge Grants A Suspension of Lawsuit On Napster, N.Y. TiMES, Jan.
24, 2002, at C4.
45. See Matt Richtel, Plaintiffs Sought Timeout After Turn in Napster Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2002, at C5.
46. Id. (quoting Cary Sherman).
47. See discussion infra Part VIII on the music industy's latest scheme to "rent" rather
than sell the music on the Internet.
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network similar to instant messaging), a search engine, and the file
sharing function of Microsoft windows. In three months, Napster-
Shawn's nickname because of his nappy hair-was born. Shawn's un-
cle John incorporated the company in the spring of 1999, and became
its largest shareholder.48
In the summer of 1999, John Fanning, Shawn Fanning, and Sean
Parker-who was also in his teens when he met Shawn through the
Internet and who had assisted Shawn in testing the program-moved
to California. John found investors to help with the initial financing of
the project. Napster established offices south of San Francisco in
Silicon Valley, but its relatively inexperienced management team
members were unfamiliar with the music industry culture. 49
For the better part of a year, Napster had problems raising sub-
stantial funding. Several venture capitalists declined to invest because
they were concerned about the music industry's copyright infringe-
ment lawsuit (which had been filed in December 1999) and because
they could not envision how Napster could make a profit. But in May
2000, the venture capitalist firm of Hummer Winblad saw an opportu-
nity where others did not, and invested thirteen million dollars for a
twenty percent stake in the company. John Hummer was a former Se-
attle Supersonics center, and his partner, Ann Winblad, was a success-
ful software entrepreneur (and Bill Gates's former girlfriend). One of
their partners was Hank Barry, who had considerable experience as a
copyright lawyer for the music industry. Barry was chosen to become
Napster's new CEO. Hummer Winblad likely figured that Barry could
reach out to the music industry and find common ground.
Hank Barry hit the dirt running. He immediately sought out and
hired former record industry lawyers and executives, offering them
major positions in the company. Apparently from the beginning,
Barry intended to move the company in the direction of a more tradi-
tional business and revenue-producing model, something the music
industry could live with. In fact, given Barry's music industry connec-
tions, one could suggest that the beginning of the end of Napster oc-
curred when Barry took the helm in May 2000. He knew that Napster
had to reach an accommodation with the music industry to survive
(and, of course, return Hummer Winblad's investment). A profes-
sional drummer before he went to law school, Barry understood the
business from both ends. As a lawyer, he had worked with Carey Ra-
48. See, e.g., Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, Ocr. 2, 2000, at 60; Benny
Evangelista, Napster Names CEO, Secures New Financing, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 23, 2000, at C1.
49. See generally Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, OCT. 2, 2000.
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mos, the attorney for the music publishers and songwriters suing Nap-
ster. Later, Barry represented A&M Records, the lead plaintiff suing
Napster. Barry had the contacts and the connections, and he could
speak their language.
Soon after Barry came on board, Napster originators John Fan-
ning and Sean Parker left the company (I would venture to say that
they were squeezed out). John Fanning moved back to Massachusetts
and Sean Parker returned to college. Napster gave Shawn Fanning
stock worth approximately nine percent of the company and paid him
a five figure salary. The company informed the media that Shawn was
continuing to work on the next generation of Napster's architecture,
although it seemed that Shawn was far more important for the com-
pany's public relations image than he was for his computer/Internet
application skills.
Napster was reshaping its image. The Napster the media had por-
trayed as a rebel outfit and a menace to the music industry was on the
wane. Within six months after Barry took charge and thirty days after
the Court of Appeals hearing, the first major transformation oc-
curred. On October 31, 2000, Bertelsmann AG's music division,
BMG 50-one of the five major record companies in court that Octo-
ber 1-announced that it was switching sides and would partner with
Napster in a fee based membership service. They would create a new
company, one that would rely on some form of a subscription service
to earn its keep. In late November 2000, Napster no longer seemed
worried about being shut down. This formerly outlaw "dot corn" was
looking to become a major corporate entity. BMG, also the owner of
book publisher Random House, hoped that by aligning with Napster,
the company would be able to utilize Napster's P2P technology to ex-
pand its online services not only for digital versions of its music, but
also for its books and magazines.
Thomas Middelhoff, the CEO of BMG, once said that he would
make BMG a powerhouse in the industry. But it had not happened,
and the company also experienced some nasty clashes with a couple
of record labels and the recording group *N Sync. Middelhoff may
have seen his partnering with Napster as a dramatic statement that
BMG's difficulties were a thing of the past, and the company was now
moving boldly forward into the new millennium. Also, by being the
50. BMG's catalog of music includes contemporary artists like the Dave Matthews
Band, Christina Aguilera, Britney Spears, Backstreet Boys, *N Sync, and Carlos Santana, as
well as Elvis Presley and Duke Ellington.
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first on board, BMG hoped to stake a foothold in the new technology,
and obtain a competitive edge.
BMG's outlay was reportedly between fifty and sixty million dol-
lars in the form of a loan. At worst, BMG would get the write off. At
best, BMG had the option to convert the loan into a prominent inter-
est in the company-a company with sixty million users who could
have at some later date rendered billions of dollars in revenue. BMG
also had agreed that once the fee-for-service went online, BMG would
drop out of the lawsuit against Napster. Apparently, Middelhoff had
been a fan of Napster, downloading songs on Napster along with his
fifteen year old son, at the same time that his company was litigating
against Napster. BMG could have sued them too.
Following the hearing, Hank Barry announced to the press that
Napster had offered to enter into settlement negotiations with the
music industry. Barry's offer was to charge the Napster users $4.95 per
month, and share seventy to eighty percent of the proceeds with the
record industry. Barry calculated that for the first year, this would
amount to somewhere around $500 million. But Hilary Rosen, the
president of the RLAA, said that the offer was not of interest to any of
the companies. More likely, no record company wanted to negotiate
with Napster regardless of how lucrative Napster's offer might be. The
companies wanted the enemy crushed and humbled. The industry was
more interested in preserving control and maintaining its profit-maxi-
mizing business model, and not in sharing proceeds with an upstart
dot com.
Soon after the February 12, 2001, appellate court decision, Nap-
ster installed filters to block access to unauthorized material. Users
employed misspellings for song titles and artists' names and con-
founded the filters. In response, Napster refined its filters and ulti-
mately blocked over ninety-nine percent of copyrighted material. At a
status conference on July 11, 2001, Judge Patel, relying on an expert
consultant's advice, ruled that Napster had to achieve "zero tolerance"
of copyrighted works in its file sharing network.51 Patel required Nap-
ster to adopt particular architecture that would block the remaining
less than one percent of copyrighted material. Napster appealed
Patel's ruling to the Ninth Circuit. It argued that Patel's order was
excessive, essentially surpassing, if not ignoring, the requirements set
by the appeals court's February 12 decision requiring that Napster po-
51. See In re Napster Copyright Litigation, Nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP & C99-5183 MHP,
at 22:2-3, 32:3, 34:19-21 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2001) (proceeding tr.), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/napster/transcript07l 11.pdf.
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lice its system within the limits of its architecture. The Court of Ap-
peals nullified Patel's order, refusing to require Napster to change its
architecture, and heard the matter on December 10, 2001.52
Although Napster was permitted to remain online until the court
considered its appeal of Patel's ruling, Napster closed down its net-
work on July 2, 2001. Napster preferred to wait until it established a
viable subscription service before returning online. Napster intended
to install the new system in the fall of 2001 but, presumably for techni-
cal and financial reasons, it postponed the introduction of the new
program until 2002.
The record companies became increasingly uncompromising and
unforgiving to Napster after the Ninth Circuit decision. The only
agreement that Napster could assemble after the appellate court deci-
sion was with a number of independent European record labels in
June 2001. However, these were small labels that did not provide
much in the way of desirable music for Napster to offer in a subscrip-
tion service. Apparently, the majors believed that after the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision they held all of the marbles. Something had to give if
Napster was to survive in the music industry. That something occurred
on July 24, 2001, when Konrad Hilbers replaced Hank Barry as CEO.
Hilbers is a native of Germany and a former chief administrative of-
ficer at BMG and chief operating officer for the European company,
AOL/Bertelsmann. A former colleague described Hilbers by saying,
"[h] e comes more from a financial, professional background. [He is]
not an outgoing, salesperson type .... But you feel he is someone you
can trust.' ' 53 In others words, he was positively corporate. Hilbers stud-
ied at the business school at the University of St. Gallen in Switzer-
land, described by BusinessWeek as "a bastion of the European
capitalist establishment." 54 If anyone still needed convincing as to who
was in charge of Napster, and whether Napster was still an outlaw, the
placement of Hilbers at the helm should have quieted their unease.
As an online music analyst described Napster after Hilbers took the
reigns: "This closes the page on Napster's adolescence and begins its
52. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 01-16308 (9th Cir. filed July 18, 2001)
(stay of order modifying preliminary injunction).
53. Jack Ewing, The Grown-Up in Charge of Napster, Bertelsmann veteran Konrad Hilbers is
no Net hipster, which may be a major plus as he charts a new course for the humbled online music
service, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE *1, Aug. 1, 2001, at http://www.businessweek.com/technol-
ogy/content/aug2001/tc2001081_936.htm (quoting Felix Somm).
54. Id. at *2.
[Vol. 36
Winter 2002]
adult career. '5 5 Perhaps, a more fitting assessment would have been
that henceforth begins Napster's capitalistic career.
Hank Barry returned as a partner to Hummer Winblad, in-
tending to remain on Napster's board. There are people who believe
that he would have been more successful at Napster if he had worked
out a license agreement with the larger American independent labels
before Patel's issuance of her preliminary injunction in the summer of
2000, and possibly even the time between her decision and the Ninth
Circuit's, a time when the independent labels would have been much
more likely to arrive at mutually agreeable terms. A contract with the
large independents could have kept Napster on its mission. By selling
their songs through a subscription service, Napster would have earned
money throughout the litigation. Presumably, Barry did not negotiate
with the independents because he did not want to antagonize the five
major companies. However, if the record companies had seen Napster
as a truly viable operation, they might not have pursued their
scorched earth policy against it.
Unconfirmed rumors surfaced that around the same time that
Hilbers was appointed CEO, Shawn Fanning disappeared from the
company's offices. Supposedly, he was profoundly upset with the di-
rection the company he had started was heading. Fanning did return
a month later. Some people believe that the company had to drop a
bundle of money on him to convince him to return. Napster obviously
could not afford to lose its poster boy at this juncture-that is, while it
was still trying to retain customer loyalty.
In January 2002, Napster previewed its new subscription model by
inviting 20,000 users to test out the program. A very limited music
selection was available. The cost of the service was predicted to be
between five and ten dollars a month.56
IV. Artists and Songwriters Who Sued Napster
Along with the record companies, certain songwriters and artists
also sued Napster. Two such artists, Metallica and Dr. Dre, captured
much of the media's attention. In the spring of 2000, Metallica, one of
the first heavy metal bands in the 1970s, and Dr. Dre, a rap artist who
also owns a record label that produces many of the most popular rap
and hip-hop artists, asked Napster to eliminate their songs from Nap-
ster's central servers. (During the litigation, Metallica permitted Nap-
55. Id. at *3 (quoting Mark Mulligan).
56. See Benny Evangelista, Napster Releases New Program, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 10, 2002, at
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ster to make their live performances and concerts available.) Napster
responded to their requests by indicating that it could not identify
particular songs and delete them since it did not keep a master list of
files. Napster offered to remove people who shared these artists' copy-
righted songs with others.
Metallica, tracking users through an independent firm over one
weekend, collected the names of 335,435 people who copied or al-
lowed others to copy Metallica's songs.57 Dr. Dre also tracked users
several weeks later, identifying over 239,000 alleged infringers. 5s Peo-
ple who were affected by the actions of Metallica or Dr. Dre found a
message on their screen the next time they tried to log onto Napster,
informing them that Metallica or Dr. Dre had denied them entry.
Napster offered to reinstate people who wrote a letter to Napster
explaining that they were wrongly terminated providing Metallica or
Dr. Dre did not file a copyright suit against them within ten to four-
teen days. Neither Metallica nor Dr. Dre-nor anyone in the record-
ing industry for that matter-had any intention of litigating against all
the people who downloaded songs. There were two obvious reasons:
first, the cost of bringing thousands of individual lawsuits against stu-
dents and others was prohibitive; and second, the negative publicity.
Metallica and Dr. Dre had already succeeded in angering a significant
segment of the student population which declared that it would never
purchase Metallica or Dr. Dre CDs again and which had set up Web
sites such as "Fuck Metallica" to spread the message.
At the same time, most students did not concern themselves all
that much with Napster's being shut down. Most knew of several other
Web sites that had similar music sharing programs, such as Gnutella
and Freenet, although these other sites were not as convenient and
effortless to access and had limited files to share because fewer people
were logged onto them. Other students changed their user names and
tried to log back on. Napster first blocked the users' Internet Protocol
("IP") addresses. Computer wizards, however, created Web sites for
the express purpose of explaining to people how to bypass the block-
age by finding another server. A small number of people were success-
ful. Napster then changed its blocking procedure by disabling the
user name and password and inserting a code on the user's computer
that blocked access from that computer under any account name.
57. SeeJohn Borland, Metallica fingers 335,435 Napster users, CNET NEWS.COM, May 1,
2000, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-239956.htm1.
58. See Rapper tells Napster of alleged copyright woes, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 18, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 4833282.
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Not every popular musician agreed with Metallica and Dr. Dre. In
1998, rap star Chuck D posted songs on his Web site for free
downloading. His record company, Def Jam, threatened him with vio-
lating the copyrights of others, forcing him to take the music off the
site. In the fall of 2000, the rock group Offspring offered one million
dollars as a giveaway to one of its fans chosen from among all the
people who downloaded one particular song from Napster. Initially,
Offspring wanted to encourage users to download all the songs off its
new album, but its record company, Sony, threatened to sue the band
for copyright infringement if it did. In the summer of 2001, Metallica
and Dr. Dre settled with Napster.
Songwriters also joined the record companies' lawsuit against
Napster. Mike Leiber and Jerry Stoller were two of them. Beginning in
the early 1950s, Leiber and Stoller cowrote such well known hits as
Hound Dog, sung by Elvis Presley (to hear a truly rousing rendition,
find the version by Big Mama Thornton); Jail House Rock, also by Elvis;
Stand by Me, performed by Ben E. King; Love Potion No. 9, sung by the
Clovers; and Poison Ivy, recorded by the Coasters. They also penned
songs for the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, and Barbra Streisand. Their
attorney's argument in the Ninth Circuit necessarily focused on the
legal issues. But five days later, Stoller wrote an op-ed piece in the New
York Times that revealed his feelings about Napster. Stoller wrote that
the songs that he had written "have been my bread and butter," and
that writing songs has taken him from ten minutes (for Hound Dog) to
five years.59 He went on to say that, "[e]ach time a Napster user
downloads a copy of a song I have composed, I am deprived of the
royalty that my work should have earned me. 60 Then, worried about
Napster's effect on his financial position, he said that Napster was
"threatening not only my retirement, but the future of music itself...
[and that] by taking the incentive out of songwriting, Napster may be
pushing closer to a time when there won't be any songs for its users to
swap."61
V. An Answer to Copyright Holders
The answer to Stoller and all copyright holders should be this:
Pay the copyright holders their money. They are entitled to their in-
come for copyright use. But do not shut down innovation. The law
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must roll with the technological changes. A protest similar to Stoller's
on the future of music was heard many times in the past-whenever
new and creative technology advanced the contemporary culture. Pi-
ano rolls, radio, television, cable television, and the VCR were all de-
nounced by people who feared the impact of the changes on their
economic well being. But technology is designed to innovate, not
perpetuate.
One obvious way to resolve the payment issue would be to model
a proposal on the industry's concept of "compulsory license." Com-
pulsory licenses are currently in effect when an artist records someone
else's song. Once a song is recorded, any artist may re-record or
"cover" the song without the approval of the copyright owner, but the
artist and her publisher must pay a compulsory license fee to the copy-
right holder.
For example, if Britney Spears wanted to record the Knack's My
Sharona, she could do it without anyone's permission. But Spears's re-
cord company would be required to pay the songwriter and/or the
publisher of My Sharona a "mechanical" license to record or manufac-
ture the song, whether on CD, cassette, or vinyl. (After Spears records
it, the songwriter would also receive royalties each time the song is
played on the radio.)
Napster lobbied Congress to adopt a compulsory fee arrange-
ment for each song downloaded on its system. That is, Napster wanted
to apply the concept of "mechanical" royalties to online distribution.
Thus, Napster would have paid a royalty to the publisher every time a
song was distributed online. (Presumably, Napster would have paid
the fee from users' subscriptions and from banner advertisements.)
But since the record companies' fundamental goal is to maintain con-
trol of the distribution of the music, even if against their economic
self interest, they have successfully lobbied Congress to reject all pro-
posed compulsory license plans with Napster. Congress needs to act
responsibly and pass a compulsory license act that will strike a balance
between the record companies' desire for control and the larger na-
tional interests in promoting innovation and encouraging the devel-
opment of new technology.
VI. The Litigation
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, who has been overseeing the case in
district court in San Francisco was appointed to the bench by Presi-
dent Carter in 1980. She is described by the local legal community as
an intelligent, thoughtful, and well respected jurist. Nevertheless, she
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seemed to have framed her opinion with a solid bias against Napster.
On July 26, 2000, in little more than two hours time, she issued a
preliminary injunction that would have essentially shut Napster
down. 62 Rather than carefully considering each of Napster's argu-
ments, she adopted the music industry's designation of Napster as a
rebel outfit that had to be enjoined immediately. She could barely
contain her attitude toward Napster and its attorneys. Her opinion
reads like the music industry's brief. Napster lawyers appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and two days later the court stayed the
injunction in order to review the key legal issues that were raised by
the case. 63
Since the image of a company pirating copyrighted works on a
massive scale had its desired effect on Judge Patel, the recording in-
dustry ran with the same image in its brief to the Court of Appeals.
The record companies' lawyers wrote that Napster "is a business to
facilitate the anonymous theft of music. ' 64 The brief continued that
"Napster's business strategy from the inception was to use Plaintiffs
[the record companies'] music to usurp and undermine the record
industry, to take over, or at least threaten, plaintiff's role in the pro-
motion and distribution of music." 65 The lawyers added that "[o]ver
87% of the music copied and distributed on Napster is pirated."66
The three judge Court of Appeals panel selected to review Patel's
decision consisted of Mary M. Schroeder, Robert R. Beezer, and Rich-
ard A. Paez.67 Within minutes after the hearing began, Judge Paez
asked David Boies, 68 counsel for Napster, whether there had ever
62. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-5183 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000)
(proceeding tr.), available at http://www.riaa.org/pdf/napsterpatel.pdf.
63. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. 00-16401 & 00-16403, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18688 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000).
64. Brief of Appellees at 3, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (Nos. 00-16401 & 00-16403).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Judge Schroeder, from Phoenix, Arizona, was the senior member of the panel.
She was born in 1940 and appointed in 1979 by President Carter. Schroeder became Chief
Judge of the circuit in December 2000. Judge Beezer was appointed in 1984 by President
Reagan. Born in 1928, he has always made Washington his home. Judge Beezer took senior
status in 1996. Judge Paez was born in Utah in 1947, and moved to California to attend law
school in Berkeley. He later worked at California Rural Legal Assistance. President Clinton
nominated him to the Court of Appeals in 1996, but because of Republican opposition to
many of Clinton's nominees, his confirmation was held up for nearly four years, until
March 2000.
68. David Boies, Napster's "superstar litigator" as the New York Times once called
him, had come from Armonk, New York, with his eight member legal staff. A lawyer on his
staff told me that Boies had appeared earlier that morning in Courtroom Two arguing a
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been a case like the Napster case. Boies pointed to the 1986 Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.69 decision. In that case, Univer-
sal, the motion picture company, appeared before the United States
Supreme Court with an argument similar to the one the music indus-
try was raising in Napster. Universal asked the judges to outlaw the
Sony Betamax home video recorder-similar to the more familiar
VCR-because it could be used, and was in fact used, to make unau-
thorized copies of movies and television shows.
Although acknowledging that the video recorder was capable of
infringing uses, the Supreme Court recognized that it was also capable
of substantial non-infringing uses-since some of the movies and tele-
vision shows were either not copyrighted or copyright owners gave
permission for duplication. 70 Moreover, the Supreme Court believed
that the video recorder had the potential to contribute significant
value to our society in the future, in ways that our society could not
necessarily conceive of at the moment. 7' The Court ruled that Sony
could continue to supply the technology to consumers and not be
held responsible for unauthorized copying by individuals. 72 Both in
Napster's briefs and at the hearing, Boies argued that Napster, having
technology capable of multiple commercially significant, non-infring-
ing uses, was analogous to the video recorder and should be similarly
protected.
Boies pointed out that approximately ten to thirteen percent of
the music traded on Napster was not in violation of copyright and that
this segment was large enough to warrant its continuation. The ten to
horse racing racketeering case via a live video link to the federal courthouse in Pasadena,
California, where the appellate judges were actually sitting. I was surprised that Boies could
switch gears so easily. After taking a forty minute break, he argued the Napster case.
Boies had worked for thirty years at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York, before
leaving in 1997. The National Law Journal described Boies as the "Michael Jordan of the
courtroom" and named him "Lawyer of the Year" in 1999. Lawyer of the Year: Boies wonder,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A8. Before Napster, he had represented the government in its
antitrust case against Microsoft. The Democrats, quick to recognize his apparent star qual-
ity, seized the opportunity and hired him in November to represent them in the Florida
election recount tragicomedy. But as with Napster, Boies was unable to succeed in the elec-
tion recount case. Even his success with Microsoft was thwarted when the Justice Depart-
ment under President Bush offered a favorable settlement to Microsoft in November 2001.
In January 2002, the New York Times reported that Boies is representing former Enron
chief financial officer, Andrew S. Fastow, in the Enron scandal. See Who's Who: Lawyers in the
Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at Cll.
69. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).




thirteen percent was music written by new, unrecorded artists who
wanted the exposure (the five music companies represent only two
percent of all artists); by songwriters and independent labels who gave
permission to download their work; by bands that have released free
music like the Beastie Boys; and by artists such as the Grateful Dead,
the Dave Matthews Band, and Metallica.
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt Boies's argument, and ruled that
the Supreme Court's decision in Sony was of limited assistance to Nap-
ster.73 The court distinguished Sony by noting that, unlike Sony, Nap-
ster had actual and specific knowledge of the users' direct
infringement.74 In addition, Napster had control over the system in
that it could terminate users who violated Napster's polices, unlike
video recorder manufacturers who had no control over their consum-
ers' use of the recorders. 75
The Ninth Circuit also drew a distinction between Napster's P2P
architecture and Napster's conduct in relation to the operation of the
system. The court conceded that although Napster's P2P technology
may have been used to infringe the copyrights, that was not enough to
impose liability on Napster.76 Nevertheless, the court wrote that
"whether we might arrive at a different result is not the issue
here[,] ' ' 7 since the evidentiary record supported the lower court's
finding that Napster knew or had reason to know of its users' infringe-
ment of the copyrights.
(During the time that the Sony case was wending its way through
the courts, the film industry, in a pattern similar to what the record
industry did with Napster, tried to shut down the new technology. In
fact, the president of the industry, Jack Valenti, analogized that the
VCR is to film "as the Boston Strangler is to the woman alone."78 For-
tunately for Valenti, the court did not take him seriously. By legalizing
the video recorder, the court made it possible for the entertainment
industry to add billions of dollars to its profit column.)
On the issue of direct copyright infringement, the court acknowl-
edged that Napster, by only providing the directory and the routing
73. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
74. See id. at 1020.
75. See id. at 1024.
76. The appellate court thus disagreed with the district court's opinion which placed
undue weight on the proportion of current use. Instead, the appellate court said that the
trial court should look at the current and future noninfringing use. See id. at 1020-21.
77. Id. at 1021.
78. Frank Pellegrini, Will Music Giants Bite at Napster's Bait?, TIME.COM *2 (Feb. 21,
2001) at http://www.time.com/ime/nation/article/0,8599,100133,00.html.
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system, did not in itself engage in direct copyright infringement.79
Only its users directly infringed the copyrights. However, Napster
could be held liable for facilitating the infringement, whether vicari-
ously or contributorily.80 The legal theories of vicarious infringement
and its sister contributory infringement work like this: A contributory
infringer knows or should know of the infringing act, and contributes
or participates in the act. A vicarious infringer does not need to know
of the infringing act or does not participate in it; however, the vicari-
ous infringer must have control and a financial stake. An example that
copyright experts use to describe vicarious infringement is where a
musician performs at a club without having first obtained permission
for performing the songs in public. Since the owner of the club has
control over the musician's performance and has a financial interest
in the success of the performance, the owner can be held vicariously
liable for copyright infringement. Since the appeals court found that
the Napster users were direct infringers, Napster could be held ac-
countable for vicarious or contributory infringement.
The court ruled that Napster's ability to police its system and ter-
minate the accounts or block the access of people who violated Nap-
ster's policies constituted sufficient control to warrant a finding of
vicarious infringement. 81 The court also found that Napster gained a
clear financial benefit because the infringing material acted as a draw
for Napster's users, and resulted in an incredible expansion of Nap-
ster's consumer base.82 In analyzing contributory infringement, the
court noted that Napster had actual and specific knowledge of in-
fringements. 83 Thus, once Napster received notice that a copyrighted
work was available on its system without authorization, Napster had a
duty to take whatever action was needed to halt the infringement.
Napster also argued that the fair use defense to copyright in-
fringement allowed a user to download songs. The United States Con-
stitution empowers Congress to enact copyright laws to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts ... "84 In promoting the science
and the arts (i.e. in making the work accessible to the public in fur-
therance of the societal goals of education, broad dissemination of
information, and innovation), the government strikes a bargain with
79. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013-14.
80. See id. at 1022-24.
81. See id. at 1023.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1022.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the artist. The government grants the artist the copyright for a certain
period of time for her artistic creation. As a general rule of thumb,
songs created after January 1, 1978, are protected for the period of
the life of the author plus seventy years.8 5 For works created before
that date, the period could be as long as ninety-five years. 86 The pe-
riod had been seventy-five years,87 but in 1998, the Disney company
convinced Congress to extend the period another twenty years88 so
that Disney could retain its copyright to Mickey Mouse, which was set
to expire in 2003. Mickey Mouse first appeared in the 1928 motion
picture Steamboat Willie.
During the time the artist holds the copyright, federal law89 al-
lows others a fair use defense to the work, so that people may cre-
atively expand on the work with a new expression or meaning. There
have been hundreds of cases interpreting fair use in all kinds of con-
texts. Fair use has been recognized for purposes of criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, and parody.
The law generally does not look favorably on copying for en-
tertainment purposes. Similarly, copying an entire song would not ap-
pear to be fair use. It certainly is not transformative. Nevertheless,
Napster made several fair use arguments in the trial court and on
appeal.
Both the trial judge, Marilyn Hall Patel, and the Ninth Circuit
rejected Napster's fair use argument that users frequently download
songs they already own in order to "space-shift" them to another
venue for convenience-such as an MP3 player, or a computer to lis-
ten to while working. Napster's argument was that space-shifting was
similar to "time-shifting" (taping for a later viewing) that the Supreme
Court in the Sony case recognized as an acceptable non-infringing,
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. 1999).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (Supp. 1999).
87. Before 1978, the duration of copyright measured from the date of first publica-
tion; after 1978, duration of copyright measures from the death of the author.
88. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998).
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). Under the statute, the following factors are considered
in determining fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
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non-commercial fair use for the video recorder.90 The music compa-
nies argued that most video recorder taping or time-shifting of televi-
sion shows is a one time event, while songs on Napster were played
over and over again. Moreover, unlike most video recordings, the
songs were transferred to other individuals.9 1 Napster countered that
since the users often owned the songs whether on CD, tape or vinyl,
the record companies could not prove that space-shifting in any way
harmed the market for its music. 92
The Ninth Circuit concluded that since Napster users shifted
copyrighted material to the general public, making it "available to mil-
lions of [users] ," and not only to the original user's hard drive or MP3
player, 93 the Sony decision, which presumably only conceived of shift-
ing the taped broadcast to the home, was inapposite.
Napster also insisted to Judge Patel and to the Court of Appeals
that the fair use doctrine protected "sampling,"-a process where
users download songs to "sample" or preview them before deciding
whether to purchase the CD. The music companies argued that Nap-
ster's position was specious, charging that sampling does not imply
downloading the entire song. But Napster pointed out that the sam-
pling was non-commercial and personal, and that the music industry
incurred no harm since studies had shown that a significant number
of people who sample frequently increase their music purchases. The
Ninth Circuit once again agreed with Judge Patel "that both the mar-
ket for . . .CDs and . . .for online distribution [were] adversely af-
fected by Napster. . . . 94 The appellate judges further believed that
even if Napster had contributed to an increase of sales of CDs, that in
itself should not deprive the record companies of the right to license
their material-which, of course, Napster had been wanting to do the
entire time. But because of the companies' fanatic determination to
90. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
91. See id.
92. The Napster situation was not the same as the online service MP3.com, where
music is also space-shifted. The Audio Home Recording Act (see infra note 96) allows an
individual to space-shift by ripping or uploading a CD into her computer and then storing
the music in a virtual locker online so that she can listen to it wherever she is. MP3.com
provided the user with a simpler procedure that did not require ripping a CD onto a hard
drive. Instead, when a user verified that she owned a particular CD that MP3.com had in its
database, MP3.com would copy the music from that CD to the user's virtual locker on her
computer. Because MP3.com had some eighty thousand CDs in its database, the record
companies sued MP3.com for copyright infringement. During the summer and fall of
2000, MP3.com settled with the record companies, agreeing to pay out approximately one
hundred fifty million dollars.
93. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
94. Id. at 1018.
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retain control at any expense, the majors would not agree. They pre-
ferred to lose sixty million potential buyers of online music rather
than negotiate with Napster.95
In addition to the fair use arguments, Napster argued that recent
federal laws also protected it from copyright infringement. In the
1990s, to accommodate the rapid growth of the Internet and technol-
ogy, Congress passed laws that permitted a person to copy a song for
her personal, non-commercial use.
Under the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act 96 ("AHRA"), a per-
son can make unlimited copies of a song for one's own, non-commer-
cial use, whether the recording is analog or digital. If you want to copy
a song (audio file) from the radio or a CD or even download it from
your computer onto a tape or disk and play it in your car or while you
are working out, the law protects you. You can even lend it to a friend.
However, you cannot make a copy from a copy.
The problem that vexed the music industry lawyers was that the
copying by Napster's users was massive in scope. Thus, even if a per-
son is allowed to download a song for his own use under the AHRA, it
is very different when sixty million people are doing it, the lawyers
argued. But the AHRA does not draw a distinction between small scale
and large scale copying. Thus, Napster argued that since the law did
not address this point, it was up to Congress to make the changes and
not the courts. The music industry responded that the AHRA does not
apply to Napster users, since each user's computer hard drive acted as
a public server where anyone connected to the Napster network had
access to that user's server. These individual servers or computer hard
drives were not protected by the AHRA. The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the record industry that the hard drives were not digital audio
recording devices because their primary purpose was not make digital
audio copied recordings. As they saw it, "computers [did] not make
'digital music recordings' as defined by the [AHRA] .97
Adding to the argument under the AHRA, Napster pointed to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 98 ("DMCA"), passed in 1998. Title
95. Exposure on Napster could easily have lead to continued appeal and the possibil-
ity of making more records. The effect of Napster was demonstrated when musicians from
Primus, Phish, and the Police joined together using the name Oysterhead to perform an
eighty minute concert at the New Orleans Jazz and Heritage Festival in Spring 2000. Some-
one taped the show, and within weeks, people were eagerly downloading the music on
Napster.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2001).
97. Id. at 1024.
98. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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II of the act, called the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limi-
tation Act, provided what the law calls a safe harbor to shield a com-
pany that would otherwise be in violation of the law.99 Congress
acknowledged that with the growth of the Internet, an Internet Ser-
vice Provider ("ISP") could not realistically monitor the huge quanti-
ties of information that are stored and delivered through its
systems.' 00
There are four safe harbors under the DMCA, 10 but Napster had
focused on the exception for "information location tools,"'1 2 such as
an index or directory. The safe harbor rules require that the ISP have
no control over the content of the information that passes through its
system and that when an ISP is informed that someone on its network
is engaging in illegal infringement of copyright, the ISP must shut it
down, unless the receiver gives counter notice justifying its actions.
Where such notice is given, the issue goes to a court for
determination. 13
Napster argued in court that even if it knew that someone was
infringing, it was not liable until it received notice of the specific in-
fringement. The record companies responded that specific notice of
infringement was not a requirement, and that because Napster had
constructive notice of the infringement it could not take advantage of
the safe harbor provision. Taking the path of least resistance, the
court said that it need not accept a blanket conclusion that section
512104 of the law would never protect secondary infringers. However,
although the record companies raised "serious questions" regarding
the statute and although "the balance of hardships tips in their favor,"
they chose to defer to the trial court on the issues, expecting the is-
sues to be more fully developed at trial.10 5
Because Napster's application incorporated innovative P2P tech-
nology, the issues raised by the Napster case went beyond copyright
infringement, and touched on the larger and tougher questions of
what limitations should be imposed on the "Information Highway."
That is, it was not only the music industry that was running scared by
99. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2001).
100. A company that provides online services or network access would be considered
an ISP if it temporarily stores information on its servers, allows users to store information
on its servers, or provides links to information. Napster apparently qualifies as an ISP.
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. 1999).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. 1999).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 12(g) (C) (Supp. 1999).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
105. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
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the creation of P2P technology. Any company that supplied informa-
tion was equally fearful. More than just music, videos, and movies
could be affected-books, comics, drawings, maps, films, cross-stitch
needlework patterns, recipes, photographs, and architectural
blueprints have all been directly exchanged among users on the Net.
The parties to the lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue.
Several amicus briefs submitted on behalf of Napster in the Court
of Appeals hearing advised the judges to exercise caution in crafting
their decision. One brief signed by eighteen Intellectual Property Law
professors10 6 and another brief by the Association of American Physi-
cians and Surgeons10 7 warned that a ruling that was too broadly
framed against Napster and in favor of the corporate record industry
and the protection of copyrights could inadvertently result in ob-
structing the development and expansion of P2P networking, thereby
thwarting the evolution of the Internet.10 8
The Ninth Circuit judges recognized that concern. The court
noted that it would not shut down Napster's P2P technology merely
because P2P technology could be used to infringe the industry's copy-
rights. Instead the court said that it was only concerned with Napster's
unlawful use of the technology for transferring songs. 109
The record companies had fought vigorously against the private,
non-commercial exceptions in the AHRA and DMCA copyright laws
of the 1990s. But Congress, understanding that it had other interests
to serve besides the record industry's, granted the exceptions. Con-
gress had two objectives in mind: first, to guarantee that the concept
of fair use would extend to the expanding Internet; and second, to
106. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of Rever-
sal, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401 & 00-
16403), available at http://dl.napster.com/amicus_law.pdf.
107. Brief for Amici Curiae Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. et al. in support of
Appellant Napster, Inc. Supporting Reversal, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-16401), available at http://dl.napster.com/
amicusphysicians.pdf.
108. For example, Intel and other companies have been developing platforms and
other gateways for promoting P2P networking in business and on the Internet. The
SETI@home screen saver that analyzes radio signals from space and searches for intelligent
life in the universe by harnessing the power of two and one-half million idle PCs connected
to the Internet is a P2P venture. The National Institute of Health has been considering
using P2P technology for a human genome project. KaZaA, MusicCity, and Grokster, like
Napster, all use sophisticated P2P software that is capable of downloading and transferring
many kinds of files that do not infringe copyrights.
109. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001).
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support evolving technology and the creation of new electronic goods
manufactured in response to the growth of the Internet.110
As to Congress's first objective, it seems that just the reverse has
happened. Section 1201 (c) of the DMCA provides that the act will not
affect defenses within the Copyright Act, including fair use."' How-
ever, section 1201(a)-described as the anti-circumvention provi-
sion-forbids anyone from breaking into someone's copyrighted work
without permission. 1 2 Courts have held that section 1201 (c) does not
apply to the anti-circumvention provision.' 13 Thus, if a person circum-
vents copyrighted work for fair use purposes, that person is still
deemed to have violated the act. That is, regardless of whether the
person has a proper fair use defense under the Copyright Act, there is
no fair use defense to the anti-circumvention provision. The DMCA
has effectively put copyright owners in control of access to material,
even material that is otherwise accessible under the copyright law
through fair use or through the public domain.
Congress' second objective was surprisingly furthered when the
electronics industry drafted an amicus brief on behalf of Napster in
the appellate hearing.114 The electronics industry apparently wanted
the court to understand that when major technological changes im-
pact copyright issues, the court should hesitate to expand copyright
protection without clear and specific guidance from Congress. Ironi-
cally, or perhaps one can look at it cynically, Sony's music division
sued Napster, while its electronics division signed onto the amicus
brief as a member of the Consumer Electronics Association on behalf
of Napster. 15
The Department of Justice and the United States Copyright Of-
fice under the Clinton administration supported the record compa-
nies' position in the Court of Appeals. The fact that the record
industry was a "friend of Bill's" while Napster was just a small dot com
may or may not have been a factor in the government's choosing to
write its amicus brief in support of the entrenched music industry,
rather than advocating for innovative technology. Interestingly, Re-
110. See H.R. REt. No. 105-551(11), at 26 (1998).
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. 1999).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. 1999).
113. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
114. Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Elec. Ass'n et al., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. C99-5183 & C00-0074).
115. See id. Sony Electronics Inc. is listed as a member of the Consumer Electronics




publican Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, sent a letter to the court advising the judges that the
government's brief did not necessarily represent the views of Con-
gress. Senator Hatch writes Christian gospel music and has had the
good fortune to see some of his work recorded and performed. His
music was also shared on Napster.
In September 2001, Senator Hatch and Senator Patrick Leahy
persuaded various songwriters and the 800-member National Music
Publishers Association to settle with Napster for twenty-six million dol-
lars. Napster paid an additional ten million dollars as an advance
against future licensing royalties. The parties also resolved that Nap-
ster would pay the publishers one-third of whatever royalties it will pay
to the record companies. 116 Judge Patel still needs to approve the set-
tlement. The contract does not cover ASCAP and BMI, two major mu-
sic publishers. Of course, this agreement does not cover the
copyrights that the record companies hold separately.
As noted earlier,1 17 the record companies may be running scared
because of Judge Patel's inquiry into their anticompetitive opera-
tions. Apparently, the companies are eager to settle and block further
inquiries into their practices.
VII. Who Earns the Money in the Record Business?
Like most large businesses, a record company's priorities are it-
self and its shareholders. Although very few musicians make a living
on their music, the record industry does well. The few artists who
make it big reap huge profits for the record companies. The majors
argue that they need blockbuster sales from those few artists to sup-
port the eighty-five to ninety percent of all albums they issue but that
are not commercially successful.' 18 However, their argument is some-
what disingenuous. The companies put their major resources behind
the albums that they expect will become the blockbusters. The albums
released by other artists are left to fend for themselves, with little to no
advertisement or promotion from the companies.
Most artists, if they are to earn any income at all, do so through
performances and direct sales of CDs and merchandise. Ideally, artists
hoped that the Internet would open up opportunities. Artists could
have found it more economically advantageous to sell merchandise
116. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Napster settles music lawsuit: net music service to pay $36
million to settle copyright suit, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 25, 2001, at 1C.
117. See discussion supra Part II.
118. See Recording Artists Fighting for Rights, DAILYJ., Jan. 8, 2002, at 3.
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and tickets to their own tours and performances directly to their fans.
Using the Internet, any number of artists could possibly have made an
end run around the music companies with relatively little investment.
However, after the record companies quashed Napster and moved to
take control of all digital music distribution, those early ideals have
nearly evaporated.
Songwriters, publishing companies, and recording companies
earn their money in the music business differently. For example, often
the artist who performs a song will see relatively little money com-
pared to the unknown writer of the song who could be receiving royal-
ties for years. Songwriters whose names are unfamiliar to us live in
some of the most posh homes in Beverly Hills, while once famous re-
cording artists often find themselves in bankruptcy court-having
spent the advances they received in recording the albums and receiv-
ing no income thereafter.
Songwriters receive royalties every time the song is played on the
radio, on television, on a jukebox, in a movie, elevator, airplane (a
huge source of income), bowling alley, or anywhere else, although the
process and rates differ when audio-visual media such as movies,
video, karaoke, and television are involved. Royalties are also collected
from foreign "subpublishers" and from sheet music sales. Since the
AHRA permits people to make copies of songs for their own private
use, Congress added a tax to the sales of digital audio recorders and
digital audiotapes. The money raised by the tax is paid to the songwrit-
ers, artists, and record companies for lost royalties and profits. Re-
cording companies make most of their money by manufacturing and
selling the CDs or albums.
An artist with power can maintain her wealth even if she does not
write the songs by negotiating for a piece of the songwriter's share.
Madonna is rich not only because she has written and recorded many
popular songs, but reportedly because she has also been able to con-
vince several of her songwriters to share the copyrights with her. Thus,
every time a song of which she shares the copyright is played on the
radio, Madonna gets paid. Another less powerful artist who did not
write the song he sings and was not able to command a share in the
rights to the song, receives nothing when his song plays on the radio.
As noted earlier, once a song is recorded, the law allows anyone
to re-record or "cover" it without permission from the songwriter. The
record label that records the song pays royalties to the songwriter
and/or his publisher for a "mechanical" license that allows the label
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to record or manufacture the song. 119 After it is recorded, the song-
writer receives royalties each time the song is played on the radio.
Artists receive royalties from the record company usually ranging
from 10% to 20% of the suggested retail list price, less the dubious
deductions for packaging (20% to 25% of the retail price), promo-
tional and other giveaways, returns, and breakage (10%).120 Obvi-
ously, in an ideal world, the artist could receive a considerably larger
portion of the royalty percentage from the sale of music online, since
the costs of digital distribution should be appreciably lower. In a digi-
tal sale, companies could not in good faith deduct costs for packaging
and breakage. Nevertheless, given the record industry's ability to con-
trol its contracts, it is likely that new contracts formed with the sale of
digital music will still shovel the bulk of income from digital sales to
the companies rather than to the artists.
Out of their advances, artists must pay their producers-who
manage the recording project, hire the studio musicians and select
the music and arrangement-between 2 1/2% and 5% of the sug-
gested retail list price of the album. Artists also have to pay their per-
sonal managers-who are involved in selecting the recording
company, the producer, and the publishing company-between 15%
and 20% of gross earnings. Gross earnings include income from the
recording as well as from licensing, publishing, and live performances.
The publishing company, which often links the songwriter with
an artist to perform the work, finds a record label to record the work.
It also looks for other venues such as airlines and ad agencies for
ongoing play of the recording. Publishing companies usually share
the copyright of the work equally with the songwriters. Not surpris-
ingly, major record labels have their own publishing arms.
VIII. Attempts by the Majors to Protect the Music
In December 1998-more than half a year before Napster's de-
but-the record companies created the Secure Digital Music Initiative
("SDMI") with the hope of protecting the copyrights of music
downloaded from the Internet and played on digital audio devices.
Since then the industry has experimented with all kinds of devices to
encrypt music. They explored an electronic watermark system that
identifies the downloaded song and the computer that downloaded
119. See discussion supra Part V.
120. For example, if the cost of a CD was $20, the record company would first deduct
up to $7.50 (25% plus 10% equals 35%) for the various deductions, and then pay the artist
a 10% to 20% royalty on the remaining $12.50.
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the song, and then determines whether the song's copyright is pro-
tected. At another stage, the recording industry announced that it was
developing an identification tag, similar to a universal bar code, that
could be embedded in songs. Emusic, which sold MP3s online, re-
ported in November 2000121 that it had created a program that could
track the digital fingerprints of songs on Napster, searching for illegal
copies.
The industry sold its first CD that "locked" songs in the spring of
2001. It was a Charlie Pride country album that could not be ripped or
copied onto a PC. However, a Marin County, California, resident filed
a lawsuit soon after the CD's release against the record company
claiming that the locked CD interferes with the fair use of the con-
sumer who wants to listen to the CD while working on her PC. 122
In December 2001, RealOne Music, a service of MusicNet-one
of the two industry-backed digital services-went online. Using Real
Audio and Microsoft's Windows Media Audio formats, the service
blocks subscribers from transferring the songs to MP3 players and Ap-
ple's iPods, or from burning songs onto CDs. RealOne Music merely
allows users to download a limited number of songs (around one hun-
dred) onto their hard drives per month. At the end of the month, the
songs expire unless the users renew the songs by continuing the sub-
scription. Pressplay also went online in December permitting subscrib-
ers who paid a premium fee to burn a limited number of songs from a
selected play list. However, subscribers were prohibited from burning
more than two songs per artist (presumably so users would not
download an entire album). Essentially, the music industry's objective
is to no longer sell the music. Rather, the industry is seeking to orches-
trate even more control over the music by only allowing the users to
rent the songs-one day, one week, or one month at a time.
Also in December 2001, several cable companies (presumably at
the record industry's urging or at least with the industry's blessings)
were considering imposing speed limits on their networks to prevent
users from downloading too many songs. Record companies and
movie studios are also pressuring ISPs to deny access to anyone who is
sharing copyrighted material on the Net.
While the push for encrypted technology and other mechanisms
for blocking digital music sharing continues, the companies persist
with their comforting and job-secure brick and mortar model.
121. See Benny Evangelista, Program Hunts Users of Napster, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 2000, at
B1.
122. See Peter Lewis, Pay to Play, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 2002, at 116.
[Vol. 36
Of course, as long as computer geniuses continue to roam the
Web eager for the challenge of breaking into encrypted files, the
game of cat and mouse between the record companies and the hack-
ers will endure. As the record companies create new technology, they
will also have to regard the interests of the electronics industry which
apparently wants to sell its products such as MP3 players, iPods, and
CD burners, and does not want rigid security systems that would result
in fewer sales of its products.
In fall 2001, people who were willing to pay around $300 could
purchase the Archos Jukebox HD-MP3 Recorder that seems to cir-
cumvent many of the security systems the industry has designed to
prevent burning CDs or sharing MP3s over the Internet. 123
The programs run by the record companies and by the file shar-
ing networks raise issues of privacy. Although this Essay cannot ex-
plore these issues in any detail, users of file sharing networks need to
be aware of both "spyware" and "adware" programs. For example, to
earn income, KaZaA and other file sharing networks have used adware
to superimpose advertising links over Web page text by attaching
targeted advertising programs to users' web browsers.1 24 Spyware has
been used to not only track user downloads and listening habits, but
to send user ID names and Internet addresses to other Websites.
125
Also, be on the lookout for "Trojan horse" spyware programs that are
designed to take over a user's computer and attach new
instructions. 126
IX. Looking to the Future
In the summer of 2000, the author of a Business Week article
wrote, "Napster may wind up among the martyrs in the Internet
Revolution."'127 Apparently, he was right. Napster as we knew it is no
more. Stanford law professor Larry Lessig, in commenting on the
even more disturbing prospect that the Internet itself is under siege,
notes that the government and the music industry have subverted
123. See Jon Fortt, Putting Halt to Music Copying is Daunting Task, S.J. MERCURY NEWS,
Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/public/startech/archive/110 7 01/
wire4.html.
124. See Stefanie Olsen & Gwendolyn Mariano, Peer-to-peer exchanges court advertisers,
CNET NEWS.cOM, Aug. 2, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-271020.html.
125. SeeJohn Borland, File-sharing programs carry Trojan horse, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 2,
2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-801599.html.
126. See id.
127. Spencer E. Ante, Inside Napster, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, at 113.
Winter 2002] NAPSTER
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
copyright law's objective of promoting the progress of science and the
arts.
Historically our Constitution created a very limited protection of
what we've come to call intellectual property. We've slowly ex-
panded it quite dramatically. This didn't really matter before the
Internet .... But now copyright law begins to regulate absolutely
everybody, as they connect their computer to the network. Before
the Internet you could set up a fan fiction club, or you could talk
about "Star Trek" with friends in your dorm room .... Now you do
the same thing on the Internet, and you're subject to the regula-
tions of copyright law. What's surprising to me is that there's been
very little reflection on the importance of maintaining balance,
and the dangers of this very strong protection, where dinosaurs get
to protect themselves against innovation. 128
The dinosaur record industry is throwing everything it can at in-
novation, and it has made some headway. But its victories will be short-
lived. Even with its power and its fierce strikes to sustain control in this
fast changing world, there will always be another Shawn Fanning with
a new design that will disrupt its plans and bring forth yet another
original way in which we listen to music. While we wait for that next
spirited idea, we can envision a future where: (1) Judge Patel aggres-
sively pursues the misuse of copyright and antitrust claims against the
record companies; (2) Congress adopts a compulsory license plan for
Napster and other music sharing programs; and (3) the United States
Supreme Court overturns the Ninth Circuit's Napster decision. In the
meantime, we will always remember Napster.
Napster was inspired. It struck a cord with sixty million people,
and not simply because the music was free. In our fast paced,
workaholic culture, we rarely found the time to lunch with a friend or
chat on the phone. We emailed when convenient, and waited for a
convenient response. In a world that seemed to care less and less for
direct contact, Napster served as a reassuring community. Napster
spanned across artificial borders. It evoked memories, passions, yearn-
ings, and thrills through the sharing of songs and voices.
The community we knew as Napster is history now. But it is one
of those blips in the narration of the world that we will fondly
remember.
128. Steven Levi, The End of the Net, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 2001, at 63 (interview with
Lawrence Lessig), available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/655756.asp. See generally LAW-
RENCE LESSiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001).
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